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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/07/2011 Accident number: 741 
Accident time: 10:40 Accident Date: 12/11/2007 
Where it occurred: EOD-12, Kolalan 
Village, Anaba District, 
Panjshir Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: 15/11/2007 
ID original source: (35) Name of source: UNMACCA and 
Demining group 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: Fuzes (PD 120 
mm/100) 
Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 19/07/2011 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
Two reports of this accident have been made available. The first is an internal report made by 
the demining group that suffered the accident, the second is a UNMACCA Lessons Learned 
document. The difference between their content is significant, and provides an illustration of 
the value of independent investigations. Made available as PDF files, their conversion into a 
DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is 
editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes available. 
The documents are reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
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INTERNAL INVESTIGATION REPORT [Demining group], KABUL November 2007 
1. Objectives 
The objectives of the internal investigation into the Demining Accident are: 
1. To gather evidence into the cause of the accident; 
2. To identify factors which resulted in the accident; 
3. To deliver the evidence to other staff within the organization; 
4. To implement corrective and preventive actions to ensure that this type of accident 
does not occur again in the future; 
5. To draw the attention of other staff to 100% implementation of standards. 
2. General Information 
Team/Site description: EOD-12, Central Region 
Location of accident: Panjshir province Anaba district, Kolalan Village 
MF/BF No: BAC task –AF0310/01020/BF002 
Date & Time of accident: 12th November 2007 at 09:45 Am 
Start date of task: 23 October 2007 
Estimated Area of task: 300000 Sqm 
Completion of task %: 6.3 % 
3. Particulars of Injured Persons 
Name: [Victim No.1], Title: EOD operator 
Date of birth: 1972 - 35 Years old, Place of birth: Kondoz province, Blood group: B Rh+ 
Experience as EOD operator: 4 years. Qualifications: DM course, TL Course, [Demining 
group] EOD Level 1 course (AMAS Level 3+) and [Demining group] EOD Level 2 course 
(AMAS Level 1 and 2). These courses were present by [Demining group]. Last refresher 
training: Friday 09th November 2007. Refresher training on 10th July 2007 - Dealing with 
mines and UXO. Last EOD course: 5th August to 4th of September 2007 - EOD Level 1 
Bomb Course. 
Name: [Victim No.2], Title: EOD operator 
Date of birth: 1977, 30 years old, Place of birth: Nangerhar province Surkh rood district. Blood 
group: B Rh+ 
Experience as EOD operator: 3 years. Qualifications: DM course, TL Course, [Demining 
group] EOD Level 1 course (AMAS Level 3+) and [Demining group] EOD Level 2 course 
(AMAS Level 1 and 2). These courses were present by [Demining group]. Last refresher 
training: Friday 09th November 2007. Refresher training on 10th July 2007 - Dealing with 
mines and UXO. Last EOD course: 5th August to 4th of September 2007 - EOD Level 1 
Bomb Course. 
4. Cause of the Accident 
Explosion during the handling of a Point Detonating Fuse (PD 120mm/100mm Artillery) from 
BAC task hazardous area to field UXO collection point 
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During the handling of UXO from one operator to other operator the fuse has fallen to the 
ground and exploded. 
5. Internal Investigation Team members: 
1-TA: [Name removed] 
2-S.Ops Manager: [Name removed] 
3-S.Medical Officer: [Name removed] 
4- Field officer : [Name removed] 
5-Training/EOD.O: [Name removed] 
6-IQA .O: [Name removed] 
6. Investigation Procedure 
a. During the internal investigation on the accident site, the accident point and the explosion 
crater was found, inspected and measured.  
b. Information and written statements were received from the support staff including the 
section leader of MCT and EOD working on the above mentioned task. 
c. The information and evidence gathered has been processed and analyzed to determine the 
cause of the accident. 
7. Chronological Overview of Events after the Accident 
Following describes the actions taken and the instructions given by the command staff directly 
after the accident: 
Description                                                                 Time after Accident 
12/11/2007 
Accident happened at                                                        09:45 
Operation of EOD-12 stopped                                           09:46 
Team leader, paramedic and two operators got to the accident point   09:47 
Paramedic started treating and doing the first aid to the injured           09:48 
Radio room at main office got the report of accident                            09:48 
Patients were loaded into Ambulance and stabilized for 7 min both injureds        09:55 
AMAC Central was informed by field officer Kabul                             09:55 
1st ambulance reached to Pnajsheer emergency hospital with an injured ([Victim No.2]) 09:56  
2nd ambulance reached to Panjsheer emergency hospital with an injured ([Victim No.1])10:01 
Internal Accident Investigation unit reached the accident site               11:35 
Internal Accident Investigation unit reached to Panjshir emergency hospital         01:30 
IMSMA Accident Report form was delivered to AMAC Central          17:00 
13/11/2007 
External Accident Investigation unit (UNAMAC) reached the accident site 13 Nov, 10:20 
8. Brief Description of Events Leading up to the Accident 
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Section No.1 of MCT 2 had started work on BAC task –AF0310/01020/BF002 located in 
Panjshir province Anaba district, Kolalan Village with the support of EOD Team No. 12 on 10 
November 2007. 
On 12 November 2007 Section No. 1 started its normal work and identified a PD fuse at 
Location 2 shown in the picture below. 
[The Victims] - operators of EOD 12 - were following the MCT section for categorisation of 
marked UXO. The PD fuse located at Location 2 was categorized as safe and [Victim No.2] 
handled it from Location 2 onto the rock wall between himself and [Victim No.1] who was 
situated at Location 4. [Victim No.1] was to retrieve the PD fuse from the wall and move it to 
field UXO Collection Point. The PD fuse has fallen from the wall to the ground and detonated, 
resulting in the two casualties. 
 
[The accident site] 
Legend: 
BAC searching line location during accident - 1 
Marked UXO by BAC Section - 2 
Handling of UXO by [the Victims] - 3 
Accident point and [Victim No.1] location - 4 
9. Brief Description of the Injuries 
A. Patient 1 – [Victim No.1] 
Left leg below Knee joint open fracture of Tibia shaft near to proximal end laterally. The bone 
fractured pieces were on multiple deferent lines but the fibula bone was remaining safe and 
secure. 
Multiple fragmental wounds on: 
• Small fragmental wounds on anterior view on right leg below knee joints 
• Anterior view on left inguinal. 
4 
• Left infra chest medclaviculer lines both side. 
• Anterior view brachial area proximal to shoulder. 
• Anterior view on forearm proximal to elbow joints. 
 
B. Patient 2 – [Victim No.2] 
A small fragmental wound on anterior view of chest inferiorly (May chest hole) unknown. 
 
 
10. On-Site Treatment of Casualties 
Open the IV line and fixed the IV canola for both them. 
Given the IV Fluids (Ringer Lactate) 1000 ml/each. 
Irrigated the casualties’ wounds with saline solution and immobilized the fracture by splint. 
Dressed and maintained the wounds. 
Applied Analgesic: Diclonat P 3ml/IM for M.Ayaz and , Pentonil 1ml dilute for [Victim No.1] 
Applied Antibiotic: Vial Pan Ampicillin 1gr/IM for each them 
11. General Condition of the Injured Persons: 
Patient 1 – [Victim No.1]:  
[Victim No.1] EOD operator health conation was successfully. The wounds were irrigated and 
redressed by hospital staff in Operation Tether the fracture was reeducated and leg was 
splinted by plaster now he was admitted in Panj sheer hospital. The patent condition was 2nd 
priority. 
Patient 2 – [Victim No.2]:  
After accident he was serious because if he had chest hole if fragment come inter pleura he 
will become on 1st priority otherwise he is on fourth priority pt. Now he discharged from 
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hospital . He was under treatment in compound under follow of the Doctors he is in rest, he 
was on fourth priority. 
12. Damaged Equipment/materials 
Uniform of two operators pairs 
13. Investigation Findings 
• The accident occurred during a BAC task. 
• The accident occurred during the handling process from one operator to another over 
uneven terrain 
• The operator was handling the fuse and giving it to another operator because of the 
natural barrier (rock wall) between them. 
• The box has fallen to the ground and resulted in the detonation of the fuse. 
• The Section Leader of EOD 12 was 60m away from the point of detonation. 
14. Conclusions 
From the evidence gathered the following is clear: 
Both of the casualties are experienced EOD Operators with several years experience and 
trained to [Demining group] EOD Level 1 (AMAS Level 3+) 
The incorrect categorization of the UXO as being safe-to-move has been made by EOD 
Operator [Victim No.2]. 
The handling of the UXO by the EOD Operator [Victim No.2]  has not been in accordance with 
the [Demining group] SOP. 
The Section Leader [Name removed] was not providing the level of supervision required of a 
Section Leader to ensure that correct handling procedures were being used. 
15. Lessons Learnt 
The following lessons were learnt from this accident: 
• The importance of diligent supervision by all supervisors during operations; 
• The importance of the correct categorization of UXO before movement; 
• The importance of correct and safe handling of UXO even if they have been 
categorized safe to -move. 
• The importance of reinforcing the importance of safety during operations to all 
deminers and operators. Experienced operators can perform their tasks incorrectly or 
negligently. 
A full day of refresher training was conducted the next day, 13 November 2007, for all MCT 
and all EOD teams. The training subjects included: 
• BAC method and how to safely handle UXO from one location to another; 
• The use of PPE during BAC; 
• Team supervision, command and control in accordance with [Demining group] SOP. 
 
Attachments: [Not made available] 
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A copy of BAC task sketch map. 
A copy of task order. 
Last refresh training plan before accident. 
Refresher training plan after accident. 
10 Pages of inspection from the relevant staff. 
Copy of IMSMA initial report. 
A copy of discharge card for the [Victim No.2] operator. 
Reported by: [Name removed] S. Ops Manager [Demining group], Date: 15.11.07 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT OCCURRED TO [Demining 
group] EOD-12 ON 12 NOVEMBER  2007 
INTRODUCTION:  
An investigation team composed of Mr. [Name removed] the QMA and [Name removed] 
AMAC OPS Assistant was convened by the Area Manager of AMAC Centre to investigate the 
demining accident that occurred on [Victim No.1] and [Victim No.2] EOD operators of 
[Demining group] EOD-12 at Kulalan Village, Onaba district of Panjshir province. The 
accident happened on 12 Nov 2007 at 09:45 hours in task#AF/0310/01020/BF002. 
SUMMARY: 
BAC task # AF/0310/01020/BF 002 is part of SHA#4 of impact survey IS#219. There was an 
ammunition store in the area and it was demolished during the period of Taliban regime and 
as a result the UXOs scattered around. According to request of the locals the clearance of the 
task was started on 23 October 2007 by [Demining group] DT# 02 supported by EOD# 12. On 
12 November at 9:45 hours two EOD operators were busy at the site to shift some detected 
UXO to collection point and as one of them ([Victim No.2]) wanted to pass three fuses (PD 
120 mm/100) to [Victim No.1] who was about 2.5 meters away and threw them toward him, 
the fuses fell on the ground next to [Victim No.1] and exploded. As a result of the explosion 
[Victim No.1] got left leg upper side fraction, knee lower side bone fractions and also he got 
different superficial injuries to other parts of his body. Meanwhile [Victim No.2] got some 
injuries to his chest. After applying first aids both casualties were shifted to Panjshir 
emergency hospital. [Victim No.1] is under treatment and [Victim No.2] was discharged from 
hospital on 13 November 2007. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The following points were found by investigation team: 
• The two EOD operators were shifting the detected UXO after categorization, but they 
were not dressed with PPE which shows poor control of team command group. 
• The team leader of the team incorrectly categorized the three fuses as inactive and 
safe to move, but actually they were not inactive. 
• One of the EOD operators threw the fuses to the other and caused it to explode, 
which shows his carelessness in regard to safety standard. 
• The investigation team met [Victim No.1] in the hospital and according to his 
narration; [Victim No.2] the other EOD operator was playing with the UXO, joked and 
threatened him by throwing the UXO toward him and the explosion happened. 
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• The team leader of the team was located about 50m away from the accident point 
and could control the activities of the team, but he failed to avoid [Victim No.2] not 
make joke and play with the UXO. It shows weak command and control of the team 
command group. 
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered: 
• Refresher training is recommended for the team and the training should focus mainly 
on UXO categorization and methods for safely handling of the UXO. 
• Making jokes, playing with UXO and carelessly handling of UXO during demining 
operation will have undesirable consequences and must be stopped.  
• The team’s command group should not ignore the safety breach done by team 
members; instead they should strongly implement approved procedure and safety 
standard during demining operation.  
• [Demining group] relevant field office is to enhance internal QA visits of the teams in 
order to improve team demining outcomes and make sure the command groups have 
the ability to maintain safety standard and control of team activities properly. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 931 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 35 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 16 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Chest; minor Leg; severe Arm; severe Leg 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. See details in text of the internal report. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 932 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 30 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 11 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: None 
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Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Chest 




The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
Victims were working without PPE and apparently playing silly games with explosive items, 
but their errors were not corrected. The secondary cause is listed as Inadequate training 
because the fuzes were wrongly identified as being safe, and the demining group conducted 
some refresher training as a result.  
The difference between the reports – throwing fuzes or placing one delicately on a wall and it 
falling off – do not necessarily imply that the demining group’s internal investigators sought to 
mislead. It is more likely that the Afghan external investigators simply knew how to get the 
truth when they interviewed the main Victim in hospital. 
The internal report included photographs of blood-stained uniforms which, combined with the 
injury photographs, proving that no PPE was being used. This is not unusual in EOD tasks 
but the fact that fuzes feature in many EOD accidents indicates that the wearing of PPE is 
worthwhile even if the detonation of the main devices would defeat that PPE. 
Working distances on EOD Tasks are usually dictated by the risk assessment’s view of the 
likelihood of any device detonating, so it is likely that the working distance requirement was 
not being breached in this accident. 
The Internal Investigation by the demining group appears professional and timely, with 
reasonable Lessons Learned, but the contrast between its findings and those of the external 
UNMACCA investigators illustrates the value of an external investigation. If the UNMACCA 
has made their full report available, that might have enhanced the lessons that could be 
learned, but the UN supported MACCA has failed to make full reports available for some 
years, so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff 
have been more responsible over sharing data than those internationals who presume greater 
responsibility. 
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